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Barthélémy F. (CEMOTEV) & Martin M., "Dummy players and the quota in weighted voting games: some further results", Springer, 18 p., 2020
Authors : Fabrice Barthélémy (CEMOTEV) & Mathieu Martin
Chapter 13 : "Dummy players and the quota in weighted voting games: some further results"
In : “Evaluating Voting Systems with Probability Models, Essays by and in honor of William Gehrlein and Dominique Lepelley”, Diss M. & Merlin V. (editors)
Springer
Pages : 18
Date : 2020
DOI : 10.1007/978-3-030-48598-6
le 10 mars 2020
2020
Abstract :
This paper is a companion paper of Barthelemy et al. (2019) which studies the role of the quota on the occurrence of \dummy" players in small weighted voting games (i.e., in voting games with 3, 4 or 5 players). We here extend the results obtained in this paper by considering voting games with a larger number of players (up to 15). It is shown that the probability of having a player without voting power is very sensitive to the choice of the quota and the quota values that minimize this probability are derived.
JEL classi cation: C7, D7
Keywords: Cooperative game theory, weighted voting games, dummy player, probability of voting paradoxes.
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